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the specific conditions required by the board and the com-
mission is a matter of record with those agencies. In effect, 
the motion of the board, and the confirming letter of the 
commission, constituted an offer to grant an exception which 
was not accepted. By its terms, the exception was ineffective 
if its conditions were not met. 
I would, therefore, affirm the portions of the judgment 
from which the appeal is taken. 
Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied May 14, 
1853. Edmonds, J., Carter, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18616. In Bank. Apr. 14, 1953.] 
HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD. (a Corpora-
tion), Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COM-
MISSION and KENNETH CHURCHILL, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Findings.-It is for the Indus-
trial Accident Commission, not a referee, to make the find-
ings in a compensation case. (Lab. Code, § 5953.) 
[2] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-"Serious and 
wilful misconduct" of employer warranting increased com-
pensation under Lab. Code, § 4553, denotes a greater degree 
of culpability than mere negligent or even grossly negligent 
conduct. 
[3] Negligence-"Wilfulness."-"Wilful" conduct, as opposed to 
negligent conduct, involves at least an intention to perform 
an act or omission with actual knowledge, or that which in 
law is deemed to be the equivalent of actual knowledge of 
the peril to be apprehended from the act or omission. 
[2] Serious and wilful misconduct of employer warranting in-
creased compensation, or action at law, notes, 16 A.L.R. 620; 58 
A.L.R. 1379. See, also, Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 118; 
Am.Jur., vVorkmen's Compensation, § 54. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 8; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 48. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 7, 8, 10] Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 190; [2] Workmen's Compensation, § 123; [3, 4] Negligence, § 8; 
[5, 6, 9] Workmen's Compensation, § 124; [11] Workmen's Com-
pensation,§§ 118, 123; [12] Workmen's Compensation,§ 272(6). 
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[4] Id.-"Wilfulness."-While gross negligence may involve an 
intent to perform an act or omission, wilful misconduct in-
volves the further intent that the performance be harmful 
or that it be done with a positive, active and absolute dis-
regard of the consequences. 
[5] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Mis-
conduct.-"Serious and wilful misconduct" as that expres-
sion is used in Lab. Code, § 4553, cannot be established by 
showing acts any less culpable, any less deliberate, or any 
less knowing or intentional, than is required to prove wilful 
misconduct. 
[6] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-Serious and 
wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and 
the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act 
which is merely negligent and consequently devoid of either 
an intention to do harm or of knowledge or appreciation of 
the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at 
the same time constitute wilful misconduct. 
[7] Id.- Findings- Wilful Misconduct.- Findings of Industrial 
Accident Commission that employer failed to "provide and 
maintain proper and adequate safety devices" or to employ 
means "reasonably adequate to render applicant's employment 
and place of employment safe" are insufficient to show that 
employer's misconduct was serious and wilful, since they con-
stitute nothing more than findings of negligence. 
[8] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-While findings of Indus-
trial Accident Commission that certain conduct of employer 
"evinced a reckless disregard for the safety of ... employee" 
and that employer "knew or should have known had he put 
his mind to it that such failure or omission was likely to 
result in serious injury" closely approach those factual ele-
ments necessary to determine that employer's misconduct was 
serious and wilful, the conduct must be with knowledge of 
the peril to be apprehended, or done with a positive and 
active disregard of the consequences. 
[9] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-A "reckless 
disregard" of the safety of employees is not sufficient in 
itself to constitute serious and wilful misconduct unless the 
evidence shows that the disregard was more culpable than 
a careless or even a grossly careless omission or act. 
[10] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding that the "em-
ployer knew or should have known had he put his mind to 
it" does not constitute a finding that the employer had that 
degree of knowledge of the consequences of his act that 
would make his conduct wilful; the standard requires an act 
or omission to which the employer has "put his mind." 
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[11] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-The words 
"serious and wilful misconduct" must be given the same mean-
ing whether they apply to an employer under Lab. Code, 
§ 4553, or to an employee under Lab. Code, § 4551. 
[12] !d.-Certiorari-Review of Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-
While findings must be interpreted liberally in favor of sus-
taining an award by the Industrial Accident Commission of 
additional compensation to an employee, even if reference to 
the record is required, where the record is devoid of any sub-
stantial evidence that the employer intended to do harm, or 
that it had knowledge of the probable consequences of its 
failure to provide more adequate safety devices or a safer 
place to work or that it exercised an affirmative and know-
ing disregard for the safety of the injured employee, and 
where, notwithstanding evidence that a similar accident was 
closely avoided shortly before the injury here complained 
of, the employer thereafter took steps to remove this hazard 
but there is no evidence that the employer had knowledge 
that this remedy was inadequate or that it had any reason 
to believe that the circumstances which nearly caused a first 
accident continued to exist, an award of additional com-
pensation for serious and wilful misconduct will be annulled. 
PROCEEDING to review an award by the Industrial Acci-
dent Commissibn of additional compensation to injured em-
ployee for serious and wilful misconduct of employer. Award 
annulled. 
Brbbeck, Phleger & Harrison and Rinaldo Sciaroni, Jr., 
for Petitioner. 
Edmund J. 'l'homas, Jr., Leonard M. Levy, Alvin L. Dove, 
Johnson, Morgan, Thorne, Speed & Bamford and Robert 
Morgan for Respondents. 
SHENK, ,J.-This is a proceeding in review to annul an 
award by the Industrial Accident Commission of additional 
compensation to Kenneth Churchill, an employee of the peti-
tioner, pursuant to the provisions of Labor Code, section 4553. 
An award of normal compensation is not contested. The 
award of $15 per week additional compensation was based 
upon a finding that an industrial injury suffered by the em-
ployee was caused by the "serious and wilful misconduct" 
of the employer. 
The employee operated a fork lift truck at the employer's 
cannery in San Jose. Switch tracks used by the Southern 
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Pacific Company ran between the plant and an associated 
warehouse, making it necessary for lift drivers when return-
ing from the warehouse to drive out of a doorway in the ware-
bouse down a short ramp, across two sets of switch tracks, 
up a short ramp and through a doorway into the main plant. 
A third set of tracks, used to "spot" freight cars alongside 
the warehouse, lay between the switch tracks and the ware-
house but did not extend through the ramp, being blocked 
off on both sides of the ramp. 
At noon in May, 1950, the employee Churchill drove out 
of the warehouse doorway onto the ramp as a switch engine 
approached on his right. He did not stop his truck. Manually 
operated blinker lights over the doorway had not been turned 
on. The employee testified that he looked into a mirror re-
flecting a view of the tracks but that he could see only as 
far as the second of two boxcars which were spotted along-
side the warehouse wall adjacent to the ramp on his right, 
and that the switch tracks were clear as far as he could see. 
There was evidence also that the boxcars shut off the view 
by the train crew of the fork lift truck coming out of the door-
way until it was practically on the track and about 11 
feet from the engine. The employee testified that he too first 
became aware of the engine at this point; that he speeded 
his motor to get across the tracks ahead of the engine, but 
his truck was struck in the back end and upset, causing the 
injuries for which the contested award was made. 
Prior to and on the day of the accident there were approxi-
mately 15 fork lift trucks in operation throughout the plant. 
Four of these trucks were continuously making crossings be-
tween the warehouse and the main plant. The injured em-
ployee testified that he alone had made between 20 and 50 
crossing·s the morning of the accident. There was evidence 
that the switching engine passed the crossing on an average 
of four times a day during the period immediately prior to 
the accident. 
The employer lJad taken precautions to prevent the occur-
rence of accidents at the crossing. Over the middle of each 
doorway there was placed a sign with crossed white lines 
and the letters '' R R'' on them. In addition stop signs were 
posted at each doorway. Prior to the accident and following 
a near accident to another lift truck driver a mirror 17 by 21 
inches in size was installed on the wall of the main plant 
opposite the doorway in the warehouse and approximately 
50 feet distant therefrom, and placed in such a position that 
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it reflected a view of the switch tracks to a fork lift driver 
leaving the warehouse. 'rhere was evidence that the view 
down the tracks afforded by the mirror was limited in some 
instances to no more than 20 feet, depending on the position 
at which one left the warehouse doorway. 
It was conceded that the employer had an "energetic safety 
program" and that the employer's safety committee had been 
instrumental in promulgating various safety rules, including 
one which required that fork lift operators stop their trucks 
before crossing the tracks. The drivers, including the injured 
employee, had been furnished copies of the safety rules and 
had occasionally been warned of the failure of drivers to stop 
at the crossing or of driving their trucks at top speed which 
varied from three to five miles per hour. However, there 
was evidence that for an indefinite period immediately prior 
to the accident the drivers had not complied with the rule 
requiring them to stop, despite the warnings. 'fheir failure to 
comply with the warnings was attributed by the drivers to 
the fact that their work load, even in the slack season, required 
that they hurry. 
In accordance with a recommendation of the employer's 
safety committee made in 1947 or 1948, the employer had 
placed a watchman at the crossing during the so-called 
"operating season" at the plant, July through October of 
eaeh year. 'l'he watchman acted as a lookout and gave a 
warning of approaching trains. One of his duties was to pull 
a manually operated switch which started blinker stop lights 
above the doorways when a train was coming. During the 
slack season when the accident occurred no watchman was 
employed, and no one was assigned the duty of sounding an 
alarm of an approaching switch engine. There was evidence 
that during the sl11ck season the blinker lights were either not 
operated when a switch engine approached, or were operated 
by ''anybody who happened to come along.'' 
Although an approaching engine on all occasions rang a 
bell, the fork lift operators could not clearly hear it because 
the motor directly below the seat on the fork lift was noisy. 
'l'he crew of the switch engine did not provide a flagman nor 
at any time did a member of the crew operate the manually 
controlled blinker lights in the doorways. 
The injured employee filed a claim before the commission 
wherein additional compensation was sought under section 
4553 of the Labor Code. That section :Provides that the 
amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be in-
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creased one-half where the employee was injured by reason 
of the "serious and wilful misconduct" of his employer. The 
commission found that the employer ''failed or omitted to 
provide and maintain proper and adequate safety devices 
to warn of the approach of switch engines along said railroad 
right of way or to adopt and nse means, methods, operations 
and processes reasonably adequate to render applicant's em-
ployment and place of employment safe .... " It was de-
tt>rmined that the injury to the employee "was caused by the 
misconduct of the employer" and that the misconduct was 
"serious and wilful." 'l'he referee had found on the same 
facts that the injury was caused by the applicant's own ''care-
less disregard of the hazard of the right of way crossing" 
and that the conduct of the employer did not "constitute a 
reckless disregard of the safety of others and a willingness 
to inflict the injury complained of," citing E. Clemens Horst 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 184 Cal. 180 [193 P. 105, 16 
.A.I-1.R. 611]. [1] However, it is for the commission, not 
the referee, to make the :findings. (Lab. Code, § 5953; Liberty 
M1lfttal Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 33 Cal.2d 89, 92 
[199 P.2d 302] .) The questions presented relate to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the findings of the com-
mission and to the conclusions of the commission as to serious 
anrl wilful misconduct. 
In support of the commission's findings there was substan-
tial evidence that the fork lift drivers crossed the tracks 
scores of times a day; that the fact that they failed to make 
tl1e required stop at each crossing was condoned by the em-
plorer and made necessary by the work load; that both the 
view of the drivers and that of the railroad crew were limited 
by the location of the tracks with respect to the doorways 
and the spotting of freight cars near the doorways; that the 
sizt> of tht> mirror together with the distances involved did 
not give a clear view of the tracks for a sufficiently safe dis-
tancP; that dnring the slack season the blinker light was 
lmrf'liable, and served as much as a trap as it did as a pro-
tection, for tl1e reason that it was operated only by the chance 
of someone 's being present when a train approached; that the 
danger to which the fork lift drivers were exposed could 
have been eliminated, as it was in the "operating season" 
by the use of a watchman, or by automatic signal, and that 
the employer had been so informed by one of the drivers fol-
lowing a near accident of the same nature as the one here 
involved. 
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The commission was called upon to apply to its find-
ings of fact a recognized standard of conduct in order that 
it could further find whether the employer had failed to 
maintain that standard. Although this inquiry involves ques-
tions of fact, the standard itself is a matter of law. The 
statute defines the standard as one which requires an em-
ployer to abstain from ''serious and wilful misconduct,'' 
which expression has often been the subject of judicial in-
terpretation by our courts. In our recent decision, Mercer-
Fraser Co. v. Industria~ Ace. Com., ante, p. 102 [251 P.2d 
955], this problem was considered at length. [2] It was 
held that "serious and wilful misconduct" denotes a greater 
degree of culpability than mere negligent or even grossly 
negligent conduct. It was pointed out that the additional 
award was actually in the nature of a penalty; that it can-
not be insured against; and that its imposition upon evi-
dence of conduct any less culpable than that specified by the 
i'itatute would constitute an unlawful taking of the property 
of one person for the benefit of another. In arriving at the 
legislative intent in phrasing the statute other decisions were 
considered which had attached meanings to the following 
similar terms, many employing the element of wilfulness : 
"wilful and wanton negligence," "wilful negligence," "wan-
ton and wilful misconduct," "wanton and reckless miscon-
duct," "wilful misconduct" all as used in tort actions (Don-
nelly v. Southern Pac. Co. (1941), 18 Cal.2d 863, 869 [118 
P.2d 465]) ; "wilful misconduct" as used in the so-called 
guest statute, Vehicle Code, section 403 (Porter v. Hofman 
(1938), 12 Cal.2d 445, 447 [85 P.2d 447]; Meek v. Fowler 
( 1935), 3 Cal.2d 420, 425 [ 45 P .2d 194] ; H owar·d v. H award 
(1933), 132 Cal.App. 124 [22 P.2d 279] ). [3] These cases 
all held that where conduct was described as "wilful" as op-
posed to negligent conduct in any degree, it involves at least 
an intention to perform an act or omission with actual 
knowledge, or that which in law is deemed to be the equiva-
lent of actual knowledge of the peril to be apprehended from 
the act or omission. [4] While gross negligence may in-
volve an intent to perform the act or omission, wilful mis-
conduct involves the further intent that the performance be 
harmful or that it be done with a positive, active and abso-
lute disregard of the consequences. (Meek v. Fowler (1935), 
supra, 3 Cal.2d 420, 425-426.) [5] It was concluded in the 
Mercer-Fraser case that "serious and wilful misconduct" as 
that expression is used in section 4553 of the Labor Code 
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''cannot be established by showing acts any less culpable, 
any less deliberate, or any less knowing or intentional, than 
is required to prove wilful misconduct." (6] It was stated 
in that case that ''the true rule is that serious and wilful 
misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and that 
the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act 
which is merely negligent and consequently devoid of either 
an intention to do harm or of knowledge or appreciation of 
the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at 
the same time constitute wilful misconduct. . . . '' 
In the present case it must be determined whether the 
commission has applied the standard set forth in the Mercer-
Fraser case in determining that the employer's misconduct 
was "serious and wilful." It was held in that case that 
the findings with regard to the conduct of the employer 
constituted nothing more than findings of negligence. [7] The 
same is manifestly true with regard to the findings in the 
present case previously set out to the effect that the em-
ployer failed to ''provide and maintain proper and ade-
quate safety devices" or to employ means "reasonably ade-
quate to render applicant's employment and place of em-
ployment safe." [8] However, further findings to the ef-
fect that this conduct ''evinced a reckless disregard for the 
safety of said employee" and that the employer "knew or 
should have known had he put his mind to it that such failure 
or omission was likely to result in serious injury'' more 
closely approach those factual elements necessary to deter-
mine that the employer's misconduct was "serious and 
wilful.'' Nevertheless, as stated, the conduct must be 
with knowledge of the peril to be apprehended, or done with 
a positive and active disregard of the consequences. (9] A 
"reckless disregard" of the safety· of employees is not suffi-
cient in itself unless the evidence shows that the disregard 
was more culpable than a careless or even a grossly careless 
omission or act. It must be an affirmative and knowing dis-
regard of the consequences. (10] Likewise, a finding that 
the "employer knew or should have known had he put his 
mind to it'' does not constitute a finding that the employer 
had that degree of knowledge of the consequences of his act 
that would make his conduct wilful. The standard requires 
an act or omission to which the employer has ''put his mind.'' 
(Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, an,te, pp. 
102, 124.) The evidence and the findings of the com-
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mission do not show that the employer had the knowledge 
of the consequences of itR act or omission necessary to make 
the performance of that act or omission a wilful one. 
In considering the findings of the commission as a whole 
and in the light of the fact that the only relevancy indi-
vidual findings have to the issues presented in the present 
case is in regard to whether the employer is liable for addi-
tional compensation, it is apparent that the commission has 
imposed upon the employer a standard much stricter than 
that authorized by law. Because the specific findings of the 
commission fall short of what was defined as serious and wil-
ful misconduct in the Mercer-Fraser case it must be con-
cluded that the commission was in error in regard to the 
proper standard. 
It is significant that the statute works both ways-hence 
the importance of correctly defining its terms. [11] While 
section 4553 provides for an additional one-half of the nor-
mal compensation where the employer's "serious and wilful 
misconduct" causes the injury, section 4551 provides that 
''Where the injury is caused by the serious and wilful mis-
conduct of the injured employee, the compensation otherwise 
recoverable therefor shall be reduced one-half. . . . '' The 
words ''serious and wilful misconduct'' must be given the same 
meaning in each section. (Parkhurst v. Industrial Ace. Com. 
(1942), 20 Cal.2d 826, 831 [129 P.2d 113]; E. Clemens Horst 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1920), supra, 184 Cal. 180, 188.) 
It was suggested in the Mercer-Fraser case that in determin-
ing whether an employer's misconduct would justify increas-
ing an award it would be significant to determine first whether 
that same misconduct would justify reducing an award made 
to the one responsible for the misconduct were he the in-
jured party. 
[12] We are not unmindful of the rule requiring that find-
ings be interpreted liberally in favor of sustaining an 
award, even where reference to the record is required. 
Looking at the record it is devoid of any substantial evi-
dence that the employer intended to do harm, or that it 
had actual knowledge of the probable consequences of its 
failure to provide more adequate safety devices or a safer 
place to work or that it exercised an affirmative and know-
ing disregard for the safety of the injured employee. There 
is evidence that a similar accident was closely avoided shortly 
before the injury here complained of. It is true that at 
Apr. 1953] HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE Co. v. IND. Ace. Co:M:. 665 
[40 C.2d 656; 255 P.2d 431] 
least a constructive knowledge could have been imputed to 
the employer at that time that such an accident might occur 
again. However, the employer thereafter took steps to re-
move this hazard. There is no evidence that the employer 
had knowledge of any kind that this remedy was inadequate, 
nor does the record reveal that there was any reason for it 
to believe that the circumstances which nearly caused a first 
accident continued to exist. 
The present action does not involve the employer's viola-
tion of an express statute or commission safety order de-
signed to protect employees. The rules laid down in such 
cases (see Bethlehem Steel Go. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 23 
Cal.2d 659 [145 P.2d 583] ; Parkhurst v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
supra, 20 Cal.2d 826; Blue Diamond Plaster Go. v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., 188 Cal. 403 [205 P. 678]) as to what consti-
tutes "serious and wilful misconduct" therefore have no 
application. 
The award of additional compensation is annulled. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
By its decision here the majority has completed the re-
actionary process, commenced by its decision in California 
Shipbuilding Gor·p. v. Ind1rstrial Ace. Com., 31 Cal.2d 278 
f 188 P.2cl 32), and carried forward by its decisions in Mercer-
Fr·aser Go. v. Industr-ial Ace. Com., ante, p. 102 [251 P.2d 
955] and Sutter· Butte Canal Go. v. Industr-ial Ace. Com., 
ante, p. 139 [251 P.2d 975], of judicial repeal of the work-
men's compensation law that an award shall be increased for 
wilful misconduct of the employer. (Lab. Code, § 4553.) I 
reiterate what I said in my dissents in those cases. The lethal 
blow has now been struck and section 4553 of the Labor Code 
l1as ht'en nullified and stricken from the statute book by 
judicial interpretation. By these decisions this court has 
blotted out four decades of progress in the field of social 
legislation for the benefit of the working men and women 
of this state, and overruled numerous decisions of this court 
and the District Court of Appeal without even mentioning 
them. 
The majority opinion holds that neither the findings nor 
the evidence establishes serious and wilful misconduct. 
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·with reference to the findings, they are clearly sufficient 
under the authorities cited in my dissent in Mercer-Fraser 
Co. v. Indnstr1:az Ace. Com., st£pra, ante, p. 129. They ex-
pressly state that the general superintendent of the employer 
knew that his failure to provide safety devices was likely 
to result in serious injury. ·while it is also found that he 
should have had that knowledge, that in no way detracts from 
the finding of actual knowledge. 
Briefly, the facts are that the employer maintained an ex-
tremely dangerous condition of its property, that is, a railway 
crossing which must be crossed by its employees, and had taken 
no steps to protect the employees against that peril. I say 
it took no steps because the evidence shows that the steps it 
did take were so completely ineffectual as to be no protection 
whatsoever. Moreover, one of the steps taken, the presence 
of the signal light to warn of an approaching train, went be-
yond being ineffectual; it operated as a pitfall and trap for 
the employees inasmuch as it was operated sometimes and 
not others. All these conditions the employer knew of, yet 
it did nothing to correct them. 
A witness, Amaro, testified that three days before the 
applicant employee was injured, he was engaged in the same 
work, and while driving a lift truck across the railroad 
tracks, barely escaped being struck by a train. He told 
Spiegel, the employer's representative in charge, of his near 
injury and that the signal light should be fixed so as to turn 
on automatically when a train was approaching because ''yon 
couldn't see the train when you came out of the door" to 
cross the tracks, that is, in effect, that none of the employer's 
devices served to safeguard against the peril; that a watch-
man or flagman should be put on the crossing. A mirror was 
placed by the employer at the door the same day of Amaro's 
near injury purportedly to give an operator of the lift truck 
a view of approaching trains but it only gave a view 20 feet 
clown the tracks. He saw the employer's superintendent at 
the crossing after the signal lights were installed and it may 
be inferred that the latter knew that they operated only 
sporadically when someone happened to operate them. It 
was not c~stomary for the truck drivers to stop at the crossing 
because their work load was heavy. This was also known to 
the superintendent. 
A representative of the employer testified he knew there 
was a train operating on the crossing at the time of the acci-
dent and that no one was operating the stop lights. 
Apr. 1953] HAWAIIAK PrNICAPPLE Co. v. IND. Ace. Co:\r. 667 
[40 C.2d 656; 2'15 P.2d 4:ll I 
Smnnl<Jri~in\?:. tl11' ('viihmee shows that Jher-e was h0rc a very 
dangerous railroad (~rossing that !Ill 1St be contin11ally traversed 
by the employec•s. lts danger IYas apparent to anyone from 
a view of the physical facts. 'l'he employer knew of that 
tlanger prior to the accident because it had placed lights to 
signal the approach of a train and had a man to operate them 
d ur1ug the busier times aml because its superintendent was 
specifkally advised by an employee, who had a ''close call,'' 
of the danger aucl that none of the devices gave effective pro-
tection. Jn the face of that knowledge the employer failed 
to do anything about it-permitted its employees to bear the 
risk of this very real hazard. Certainly it is wholly reason-
able to draw an inference that its conduct was in reckless dis-
regard of its employees' welfare. Indeed, its conduct amounts 
to intentionally subjecting its employees to injury, and this 
condition was permitted to exist solely because protection 
would cost the employer money. In the face of the foregoing 
facts which the record di8closes without contradiction, the 
majority opinion states: ''The evidence and the findings of the 
eommission do not shmv that the employer had the knowledge 
of the consequences of its act or omission necessary to make 
the performance of that act or omission a wilful one. . . . 
Looking at the record it is devoid of any substantial evidence 
that the employer intended to do harm, or that it had actual 
knowledge of the probable consequences of its failure to pro-
vide more adequate safety devices or a safer place to work 
or that it exercised an affirmative and knowing disregard for 
the safety of the injured employee.'' I cannot reconcile the 
foregoing statements with an honest analysis of the record in 
this case. It is undi8puted that during the so-called busy 
season, the employer maintained a watchman at the crossing 
to guard against such accidents as the one here involved. The 
employer, therefore, knew that the crossing ·was a dangerous 
oae and that safety measures must be taken to guard against 
accidents of this character. 'l'he only satisfactory safety 
measure which had been employed was the maintenance of a 
watchman or an employee to manually operate the blinker 
lights. 'l'his safety measure was abandoned by the employer 
during the nonbnsy season although the risk was just as great 
to the employee during the nonbusy season as during the busy 
season. In the face of this factual background may it be said 
·with the slightest regard for the truth, that "The evidence 
and the findings of the commission do not show that the em-
ployer had the knowledge of the consequences of its act or 
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omission necessary to make the performance of that act or 
omission a wilful one," or that "the record is devoid of any 
substantial evidence that the employer ... had actual knowl-
edge of the probable consequences of its failure to provide 
more adequate safety devices or a safer place to work or that 
it exercised an affirmative and knowing· disregard for the 
safety of the injured employee.'' 
I am constrained to repeat a statement hereinabove made, 
that the only reason this hazardous condition was permitted 
to exist was solely because the maintenance of an adequate 
safety measure would cost the employer money. The Legis-
lature by its enactment of section 4553 of the Labor Code 
sought to correct this evil, but the majority of this court, 
solicitous only of the financial welfare of the employer, says 
no, it is too great a burden for the employer to bear. So 
we are back where we were 40 years ago so far as the en-
forcement of safety regulations is concerned. 
It is the old story of the will of the people and the Legis-
lature being defeated by reactionary court decisions. To 
protect employees against unnecessary risks, the Legislature 
enacts a law providing that an employer must provide a safe 
place for his employees to perform their work, and that failure 
to do so constitutes wilful misconduct on the part of the em-
ployer entitling an employee injured thereby to an increased 
award of compensation. Obviously such a law tends to 
create increased vigilance on the part of employers to pro-
vide safety devices and thus reduce the number of industrial 
mJuries. There can be no doubt that the present law has 
had a salutary effect. Its nullification by this court is not 
only a travesty on social justice but an insidious abuse of 
judicial power. 
I would affirm the award here made. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied May 7, 
1953. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition shonld 
he granted. 
